HANDLE hFile = CreateFile(targetPath, GENERIC_READ, 0, NULL, OPEN_EXISTING, FILE_ATTRIBUTE_NORMAL, NULL);
if (hFile != INVALID_HANDLE_VALUE) {
// Abuse LockFileEx to deny all access to other processes
OVERLAPPED overlapped = {0};
LockFileEx(hFile, LOCKFILE_EXCLUSIVE_LOCK, 0, 0xFFFFFFFF, 0xFFFFFFFF, &overlapped);
// Keep handle open to maintain the lock indefinitely
}Standard EDRs look for 'file write' patterns associated with encryption (read-modify-write). GhostLock bypasses this by only 'reading' and 'locking.' Mitigation requires monitoring for processes that open a high volume of handles with `LOCKFILE_EXCLUSIVE_LOCK` and no subsequent I/O activity.
Defensive Architecture: GhostLock: Abusing the Windows File API for 'Encryption-less' Ransomware
Behavioral exploit sequence breakdown and vendor-neutral choke point interception.
The GhostLock POC demonstrates how a legitimate Windows API, `LockFileEx`, can be used to achieve the primary goal of ransomware—denial of access—without the need for complex encryption logic. By opening a file with exclusive access and holding the handle, an attacker can prevent any other process (including the user or backup software) from reading or writing to the file.
Primary Sourcing Telemetry: Synthesized from The CyberSec Times Defensive Engineering Lab under Transformative Fair Use for defensive security awareness.
Explore the Complete Broadsheet Edition
This briefing is part of the 4-page daily intelligence broadsheet published on 2026-05-12.