Execution Path Analysis: The target attack path involves the identification of vulnerable LLM endpoints via automated queries, followed by credential harvesting and aggregation. The attacker then reconfigures a unified API gateway to serve the compromised inference service. This process is facilitated by multi-stage operations where initial entry points are established through poorly secured registration endpoints. The behavioral breakdown pinpoints the lateral movement steps: reconnaissance, initial access, credential abuse, aggregation, and finally, consolidation into a self-validating supply chain. The detection logic mandates continuous monitoring of API utilization patterns while cross-referencing request origins for deviations from baseline behavior. For scenario replication, testing should emulate both the credential harvesting and the subsequent aggregation phase.

# Architectural Zero Trust Mitigation & Detection Logic
# Policy: IAM Identity Isolation & Boundary Control

if (request.origin not in trusted_IPs) {
    trigger_alert();
    block_request();
}

// Sigma Signature Example
rule Inference_SupplyChain_Abuse {
    meta:
        description = "Detects anomalous aggregation of API access indicative of inference supply chain abuse"
    condition:
        event.type == 'API_ACCESS' and event.count > threshold
}

Choke Point Mitigation: Deploy a Zero Trust framework that mandates strict IAM boundary controls and enforces rigorous WAF inspection rules at the application layer. Segregating API management functions from user authentication mechanisms is advised. Policy recommendations include leveraging Sigma and YARA rules to monitor API anomalies in real time, while automating rapid nullification of suspect sessions. The multi-layered approach should incorporate rate limiting, anomaly detection through machine learning, and periodic audits of credentials stored in access databases.